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The Right of Publicity Goes on Tour
by Cyd B. Wolf
The 1981 Rolling Stones U.S. tour
is reported to have been the most
profitable in rock and roll history,
producing an estimated $80 million in
gross income - nearly half of that
from the sale of souvenir merchan-
dise. To protect that income, the
band's attorneys launched a nation-
wide blitz obtaining ex parte court
orders providing for the seizure of
unlicensed T-shirts, buttons, pins,
bumper stickers and other unautho-
rized merchandise bearing the Roll-
ing Stone name and the distinctive
tongue and lips logo. While the tre-
mendous legal effort on behalf of the
Rolling Stones may be unprecedented
in rock band history, rock and roll
may have earned a distinction in legal
history for its role in the development
of the emerging common law "right
of publicity."
Life, Liberty & the
Pursuit of Publicity
The Supreme Court in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1977), described the right of pub-
licity as the right of the individual to
control and profit from the commer-
cial exploitation of his name and like-
ness. The right has been character-
ized as a valuable property right,
"...representing the fruits of an indi-
vidual's investment in the commercial
development of the use of his person-
ality." Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
652 F.2d 278, 287 (2nd Cir. 1981)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting). As a corol-
lary, it has been held that where the
right of publicity has been commer-
cially exploited during the individual's
life, resulting in explicit contract rights,
it should descend at the death of the
entertainer like any other intangible
property right. The right is closely
analogous to the patent and copy-
right laws, providing an economic
incentive for the performer to make
the investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public.
The right of publicity is limited only
by the First Amendment which does
not extend protection to commercial
exploitation. Consequently, any un-
authorized appropriation of the pub-
licity value in another's name or like-
ness is actionable.
The extensive litigation brought on
behalf of the estate and various licen-
sees and sub-licensees of the legend-
ary musical great, Elvis Presley, has
done much to clarify the law attend-
ing unauthorized use of publicity
rights. In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979), plaintiffs-
licensees obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion against the defendant to restrain
the sale of a poster entitled, "In Memory,"
bearing a photograph of Elvis Presley
and the dates, "1935-1977." In a com-
panion case raising similar legal issues,
Factors Etc. v. Creative Card Company, the
court concluded that "...a recognized
property right, the 'right of publicity,'
inhered in and was exercised by Elvis
Presley in his lifetime, that it was
assignable by him, and was so assigned,
that it survived his death and was
capable of further assignment." 444
F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Accordingly, the defendants were en-
joined from manufacturing, selling or
distributing copies of the poster and
other souvenir merchandise bearing
Presley's name or likeness. The Second
Circuit, affirming the injunction,
stated:
There can be no doubt that
Elvis Presley assigned to Boxcar
[the corporation established by
Presley to license his publicity
rights] a valid property right, the
exclusive authority to print, pub-
lish and distribute his name and
likeness... The identification of
this exclusive right belonging to
Boxcar as a transferable prop-
erty right compels the conclu-
sion that the right survives Pres-
ley's death. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d at 220-221.
Recently, in an action against the
producer of The Big El Show, a produc-
tion featuring an Elvis Presley imper-
sonator, the estate of Elvis Presley
obtained extensive preliminary relief
restraining the defendant from using
the name or design of any service
marks, or the image, likeness or per-
sona of Elvis Presley in any promo-
tional materials, in advertising or in
connection with the offering or rend-
ering of any musical services. The dis-
trict court sitting in New Jersey found
that New Jersey supports a common
law right of publicity consistent with
the approach of the majority of the
courts which have found the right to
be a property right. Based on evi-
dence of licensing agreements for the
sale of merchandise, the court con-
cluded that Elvis Presley exercised his
right of publicity, commercially exploit-
ing his name and likeness during life
and, "...thus, having attained a con-
crete form [explicit contract rights]....
[the right of publicity] should des-
cend at the death of the individual
'like any other intangible property
right'." Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,
513 F.Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981).
In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d
813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160
Cal.Rptr. 322, 329 (1977), the court
held that Lugosi's publicity rights, not
exploited during his life, did not survive
his death. Lugosi is factually distinguish-
able from the Presley cases, in which
there was proof of prior exploitation
by the decedent. In Lugosi, suit was
brought by the widow and surviving
son of Bela Lugosi, who played the
title role in the 1930 film Dracula,
seeking to recover profits made by
defendant movie company through
its licensing arrangements of the
Count Dracula character. At issue
was a grant of rights provision in a
contract between the actor and the
producer of the motion picture Drac-
ula, in which defendants were granted
the right to use and give publicity to
Lugosi's name and likeness in connec-
tion with the advertising and exploi-
tation of said photoplay. The heirs
claimed rights in the remainder of the
commercial licensing not granted to
Universal. The appellate court rejected
claims by Lugosi's heirs that the un-
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realized potential ability of Lugosi to
profit from his attributes during his
lifetime was a descendible property
right: "If rights to the exploitation of
artistic or intellectual property never
exercised during the lifetime of their
creators were to survive their death,
neither society's interest in the free
dissemination of ideas nor the artist's
rights to the fruits of his own labor
would be served." Id.
The position taken by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is in complete
accord with the majority of courts
which require proof of some form of
exploitation for survival of the right
of publicity. The district court in Hicks
v. Casablanca Records, holding that
Agatha Christie's right of publicity
survived her death, outlined the ap-
propriate criteria: "...a party claiming
the right must establish that the
decedent acted in such a way as to
evidence his or her own recognition
of the extrinsic commercial value of
his or her name or likeness, and
manifested that recognition in some
overt maner." 464 F.Supp. 426, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The courts have
expansively applied this rationale and,
in fact, the Hicks and Lugosi courts both
intimated that an inter vivos transfer
of rights in one's name and likeness is
exploitation sufficient to support a
finding that the right descends at
death. As Judge Mosk noted in the
Lugosi case, an inheritable property
right can be either created or elimi-
nated by contract. 25 Cal.3d at 827,
603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
In Lugosi, the grant of rights provision
in an employment contract with Uni-
versal was construed as granting all
residuals flowing from the commer-
cial exploitation of the Dracula char-
acter to the employer. Had Lugosi
desired to withhold any effects of the
employment from exploitation, he
could have provided in the contract
for the payment of royalties, thereby
giving his heirs a protectable property
right.
The contractual validity of public-
ity rights is clear in the context of the
Presley controversy. As part of the
agreement between Elvis Presley and
Boxcar, the performer retained for
himself a separate property right, the
right to a percentage of the royalty
income realized by Boxcar from com-
mercial exploitation of the design of
any service marks, or the image, like-
ness or persona of Elvis Presley. There
is no legal rationale for terminating
Boxcar's exclusive property right upon
the death of Presley, who was merely
the beneficiary of an income interest
in Boxcar's exclusive right. Rather,
the income interest continually pro-
duced from Boxcar's exclusive rights
of commercial exploitation should inure
to Presley's estate at death like any
other intangible property right. This
result, allowing an individual to pro-
vide for his heirs, is consonant with
the public policy of providing incen-
tives for capital investment and indi-
vidual enterprise. Recognition of a
post-mortem right of publicity pro-
tects the interests of all parties who
would invest time and money in the
commercial development of the pub-
licity right into valuable capital assets.
The Right of Publicity and the
Rights of the Public
The primary social policy that deter-
mines the legal protection afforded to
unauthorized commercial portrayals
is based on the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech and press.
Where the unauthorized portrayal
has no appreciable value as either
public information or creative expres-
sion, but functions primarily as an
unauthorized commercial exploitation
of another's name and likeness, the
particular portrayal is not entitled to
First Amendment protection. In
Zacchini, the Supreme Court refused
to extend First Amendment protec-
tion to a news report which broadcast
plaintiff's 15-second "human cannon-
ball" act in its entirety. The Court
characterized the facts in Zacchini as
presenting, "...what may be the strong-
est case for a 'right of publicity' -
involving not the appropriation of an
entertainer's reputation to enhance
the attractiveness of a commercial
product, but the appropriation of the
very activity by which the entertainer
acquired his reputation in the first
place." Id.
In Factors Etc. v. Creative Card Co., the
court held that souvenir merchandise
is not newsworthy in the First Amend-
ment sense, and accordingly, rejected
a claim of First Amendment privilege
for commercially sold "memorial pos-
ters" of Elvis Presley. Employing the
Zacchini rationale, the court described
Presley's act as, "...including the total-
ity of his persona - performance,
image, and name." Id. Consequently,
the court found a strong case for a
violation of Presley's right of public-
ity, which he had exclusively assigned
to the plaintiff. The court concluded
that, "...there [was] a rush to capital-
ize on the Presley image in [the] post-
mortem period, and... [the assignee's]
exclusive property rights in the manu-
facturing and marketing of Presley
souvenir merchandise... [had to] be
protected [during that] time." Id.
In yet another suit involving the
exploitation of Presley's attributes,
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors
Etc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.) cert. denied,
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101 S.Ct. 358 (1980), the court reached
a contrary decision. Public contribu-
tions were solicited to pay for a bronze
statue of Elvis Presley to be erected in
downtown Memphis. Donors of $25
or more received small pewter repli-
cas of the statue. The Sixth Circuit,
purportedly construing Tennessee law,
refused to enjoin distribution of the
statuettes holding that Elvis Presley's
exclusive right to publicity did not
survive his death and that, after death,
the opportunity for gain shifts to the
public.
There are two theories under which
the result reached in the Memphis case
can properly be characterized as a
First Amendment exception to a right
of publicity claim: The monument
was a work of art and the pewter
replicas were tokens of gratitude to
those who made public contributions.
Alternatively, the statue was a public
monument and the contributions
amounted to public financing of the
project. Under either theory, the Mem-
phis situation is concededly entitled to
First Amendment protection and falls
outside the scope of the right of pub-
licity claim.
The Sixth Circuit's decision, how-
ever, went beyond First Amendment
analysis: the court categorically re-
jected the notion of survivable prop-
erty rights in a celebrity's name and
likeness. The court reasoned that the
personal nature of the right rendered
it non-devisable and disagreed with
other courts which have maintained
that recognition of survivable public-
ity rights significantly inspires crea-
tive efforts. According to the court,
allowing an individual's name and
likeness to enter the public domain at
the end of his life, strikes an approp-
riate balance between the competing
and countervailing interests of the
individual, who through his effort
and talent has created a unique per-
sona, and the public's interest in the
free dissemination of ideas: political,
literary or artistic, even by commer-
cial sources.
The Sixth Circuit identified the
potential difficulties created by recog-
nition of a descendible right of public-
ity: the personal nature of the right,
its possible conflict with the First
Amendment and the problems in lim-
iting its scope and durational viability.
However, there is an alarming lack of
appreciation in the Memphis decision
for the legal and economic havoc
resulting from non-recognition of this
valuable intangible property right.
Furthermore, in a recent Tennessee
case, the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Memphis was found to be a misapplica-
tion of Tennessee law in which there
is ample legal precedent for recogniz-
ing a survivable right of publicity.
In response to the Sixth Circuit's
concerns regarding the scope of the
right and its possible conflict with the
First Amendment, it is submitted that
a fundamental limitation inheres in
the judicially recognized right of pub-
licity. The right exists only by virtue
of the individual's commercial devel-
opment of his persona and is limited
to commercial products. Where an
unauthorized portrayal is neither crea-
tive expression nor public informa-
tion but functions primarily as an
unauthorized commercial exploitation
of another's name and likeness, the
First Amendment has no application.
Proof of prior exploitation by the
individual during his lifetime, ex-
pressed in explicit contract rights,
enables the court objectively to deter-
mine identifiable economic harm. The
publicity contract represents a formal
realization of an individual's potential
ability to capitalize on the publicity
value of his name and likeness. Through
the medium of contract, an otherwise
unexploited opportunity can be trans-
ferred into valuable intangible prop-
erty rights. The identification of this
right as a valid transferable property
right ensures that the right descends
like any other intangible property
right.
The court in Memphis was most
troubled by the possibility of devis-
able publicity rights existing in perpe-
tuity. It has been suggested that a
durational limit should be imposed on
the viability of a post-mortem right of
publicity - perhaps patterned after
the term of copyright protection.
Clearly, a right of publicity which
terminates with the death of the orig-
inator is of an indefinite term and
would unduly burden the saleability
of the right. This writer proposes that
where the right has been commer-
cially developed and transferred, re-
sulting in explicit contract rights, the
right to commercial use of name and
likeness should continue for as long
as it has value to its owner and is
continually exploited. A requirement
of continued exploitation would mit-
igate the concern that availability of a
celebrity's persona may be withheld
from the public. As a practical matter,
publicity rights generally tend to lose
their useful commercial value after a
reasonable period of time. The copy-
right laws have already recognized
the feasibility of granting individuals
the economic advantage of a limited
monopoly to encourage free enter-
prise and creativity by allowing the
individual to profit from his own
efforts. Intangible property rights in
the exclusive use of tradenames and
names of establishments have also
been held to be survivable. It is sub-
mitted that recognition of a surviv-
able right of publicity in certain defined
circumstances is consistent with the
social policies which encourage free
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